The New Federalism of Mexico's Party System

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine recent Mexican politics to explore the role of formal and informal institutions in structuring federal politics. Using roll-call data, we test for regional conflict in national legislative parties. We show how regional cleavages were absent during the period of one-party dominance, but quickly emerged when the party system was transformed. All major parties show some evidence of divisions, but the effects are especially pronounced for legislators elected under personalistic rules and legislators with copartisan governors. Our results help explain the diversity of federal forms, and demonstrate the importance of both formal and informal institutions in structuring the political arena.

Introduction

Decentralized political institutions, with authority divided between central and regional governments, have been widely lauded for their economic and political benefits. On the political front, regional autonomy helps manage deep-rooted social divisions and gives important minority groups political space in subnational politics. On the economic front, decentralization is purported to create competition between subnational units for investment and human capital, leading to improved property rights, economic growth, and human welfare (Chandler, 1987; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Dyck, 1997; Manor, 1998; Riker, 1964; Rodden, 2002; Ross, 2000; Stansel, 2002; Stein, 1999; Stepan, 1999; Suberu, 2001; Weingast, 1995).

Critics of federalism point to its institutionalization of regional conflict, and its detrimental impact on national agenda formation. Federalism creates an additional layer of political competition and formalizes existing regional competitions and disagreements. Subnational jurisdictions naturally compete for federal transfers, pork, and even natural resources. Certainly local pressure for resources do not depend on federalism, but a federal form of government cements the lines of competition and naturally organizes dispersed and otherwise fleeting and unorganized shared interests(Chandler, 1987; Scharpf, 1995; Ross, 2000; Mainwaring, 1997; Suberu, 2001). The result is that national policy agendas may be stalled or sidetracked by regional conflicts.[1]

One manifestation of powerful competing subnational agents is the fragmentation of national parties. National legislators may find their allegiance and accountability divided between agents of national and subnational interests. When these interest are not aligned, legislators find themselves torn between "competing principals"(Carey, 2007). In other words, sometimes legislators vote with a national party, but other times they are more responsive to subnational interests, to the detriment of national policy agendas, debates, and the consolidation of the party system.

However, while political scientists have recognized the importance of centralization and decentralization for many facets of politics, we lack a general framework to explain variation across systems. Most decentralized systems are federal, but many *formally* federal systems are highly centralized. Indeed, there is great diversity in the influence of subnational political actors over national politics across federal systems. At one extreme are cases like Brazil and Argentina, where substantial policy and political authority resides in subnational units - states in Brazil, provinces in Argentina. At the other extreme are cases that we normally think of as de facto unitary systems, but in fact have many of the same formal institutions as federal systems.[2]

Most previous work suggests that a combination of formal and informal institutions determine whether federalism leads to regionalization of parties. Mayer (1970) argues that a key distinction is between congruent and legalistic federalism. Legalistic federalism is the formal institutional structure of subnational governments without systematic cultural or economic differences across states. Congruent federalism combines the legal structures with diverse subnational societies. Chandler (1987) finds that the key features of federalism are the existence of regional cleavages and the decentralization of authority. In combination, these accentuate the "fragmenting or centrifugal effects" of federalism(Chandler, 1987, 156). Thorlakson (2003) takes a more structural approach, arguing that both resource and policy decentralization lead to less vertical integration and more decentralized parties. Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) expand on this literature, arguing that the key variable is the allocation of resources between national and subnational jurisdictions. Where resources are centralize, "voters develop national policy preferences, and candidates associate themselves with certain national policy positions. As a result, local party systems and national party systems begin to resemble each other"(Chhibber and Kollman, 1998; ?, p. 335). Other scholars have responded by noting that the resource argument is most appropriate in pork-oriented systems, and is limited

in its effects to the ruling party that controls national, or subnational resources.

In this paper, we examine the impact of the decentralization of the political system on the nationalization of parties, focusing on several formal and informal institutions. We predict differential effects of decentralization as a function of electoral rules, electorates, and subnational resource access. Our empirical analysis explores how the decline of the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) transformed the political arena. Under one-party dominance, Mexico was a highly centralized political system. Loyalty and support were maintained by distributing government resources and concessions to key social groups. The decline of the dominant party, culminating in an opposition party capturing the Presidency in 2000, transformed the political system. The informal institutions of centralization were destroyed, leading to a new federalism in Mexico and previously unimaginable levels of state autonomy.

We demonstrate that these changes were accompanied by a transformation of the party system. Using roll-call vote analysis, we show that after the PRI's exit from power, all parties show increased evidence of regional divisions on roll call votes. These effects are weakest - and parties most nationalized - for legislators from more ideological parties, especially those elected under party-strengthening electoral rules. The regional effects are strongest - with greatest decentralization of parties - for legislators from less ideological parties, especially those elected under personalistic electoral rules or those with powerful copartisans in their home state.

This paper contributes to our understanding of contemporary Mexican politics, an important country deserving of study. But more broadly it helps us understand the nature of federalism, its reliance on formal and informal institutions to structure the political arena, and the contingent nature of its impact on the party system.

We proceed in three steps. We first provide an overview of the mechanisms of federalism

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that affect nationalization of parties, and apply these frameworks to the Mexican federal system, examining institutions shaping levels of decentralization during and after the decline of the one-party system. Second, we use this discussion to generate hypotheses regarding roll-call voting behavior, and test these hypotheses using an original dataset. Third, we consider the implications, limitations, and future research implied by our work.

Federal Systems and National Legislatures

Our framework for studying legislative parties in federal systems is one of political ambition and diverse gatekeepers. Essentially, we expect national parties to be divided by region when there are subnational actors that have both *motive* and *opportunity*. By motive, we mean that subnational actors are mobilized by divisive issue confronting the national legislature. By opportunity, we mean that these subnational actors control key resources that are valuable for legislators' political careers. When both conditions are met, we expect national legislators' behavior to be influenced by subnational pressures. These need not be unique to federal systems, but in many cases, federal forms of government reinforce both, and increase the likelihood of regional cleavages in parties.

In terms of motive, federal systems usually see more regional diversity and political conflict than unitary systems. This is because federalism reinforces existing regional conflicts and creates new ones. In most cases, federalism was chosen specifically to accommodate existing regional tensions or diversity. In addition, federalism assigns voters and other political actors to "teams" in a zero sum game of resource distribution. For example, the distribution of Colorado River water in the United States, for example, mobilizes subnational actors. In Brazil, recent discussion of distributions of anticipated oil revenue across states have been highly contentious. These examples are of between-state disagreement, but conflict may also emerge between subnational and national interests over

the sharing of tax revenue.[3]

In terms of opportunity, federalism can empower existing local actors and even create new actors that can wield influence over national legislators. For example, elections in federal systems are nearly always organized hierarchically within state or provincial units. In many cases this results in ballot access and campaign resources being controlled by a subnational party organization.[4] Federal systems typically decentralized budget resources, empowering subnational executives with substantial influence over policy and pork. For voters, federalism reinforces their subnational identity and shared stakes in the political game. Indeed, the simple disaggregation of elections to states guarantees encourages individuals to think about politics along state lines and mathematically, increases the role of state diversity in political outcomes.

For national legislators, the challenge comes when influential subnational actors are mobilized and disagree with the national party's position. Legislators are thus stuck between "divided principals"(Carey, 2007) - facing competing pressure from national and local actors. In some contexts, national leaders dominate and parties remain disciplined. In others, local interests win, and parties are divided into regional blocs.

Which subnational political actors wield authority over national legislators in federal systems, and how influential will they be? The answer will depend on the structure of the political system, including electoral system and constituency interests. However, previous work suggests three usual suspects in presidential systems: local electorates, local party bosses or organizations, and governors. Each usually has some gatekeeping authority over career opportunities, and each often has points of disagreement across states. Voters across states may have significant policy disagreements, even within party. They may also have simple conflicts over resource or waste distribution. Differences in voters' preferences will spill over into the behavior of state parties and governors, which

will also be shaped by subnational elite preferences and career goals. The levels and mechanisms of influence can vary, but voters are the ultimate gatekeeper for current and future office. Subnational party organizations may be able to influence national legislators when they control ballot access for current or future political office, and may be able to mobilize party resources and organizations for campaigns. Governors most frequently wield influence through their control over government resources: appointments and other jobs, pork, and even just endorsements and campaign help.

We reiterate that both motive and opportunity are necessary conditions for subnational cleavages in national parties. Note that if there is no motive - if local gatekeepers do not care about national issues - their potential influence is unused and has no impact on national legislative parties. Alternatively, if local gatekeepers are mobilized but in agreement across states, their influence is *unifying* and reinforces national party cohesion, rather than causing within-party disagreements.[5] But as many federal systems are regionally diverse, local political actors are likely to have some disagreements that can be reflected in national parties. Some of these are policy based, and may reflect long-standing opinion differences. Other policy differences are naturally created by federalism - conflict over which state gets a new military base, which will host a convention, who gets stuck with nuclear waste, and who gets more drinking water (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981).

Mexico

We focus in this paper on the case of Mexico, for two reasons. First, Mexico is an important case in its own right and deserving of study. It is one of the largest democracies, has undergone a recent transition, and it is an important player in the Americas. Second, Mexico provides useful variance for studying the impact of decentralization on national parties. Most importantly, Mexico has undergone a dramatic transformation. Though formally federal and fairly decentralized,

informal institutions for many years created a highly centralized political system. Recent changes destroyed these informal institutions, and have created a new federalism - with newly empowered subnational actors competing with national actors over national issues. This transformation provides an opportunity to study the impact of decentralization within a single national case. Even better, Mexico provides variance on electoral systems, nomination procedures, and even the extent to which pork is important for electoral outcomes. The result is that we can study the interaction of decentralization with other key institutions, all within a single national case. This allows us to control for many potential confounding variables, unlike heroic attempts to compare very different cases, say Japan and Brazil(**?**).

In this section, we examine the institutions and incentives of the Mexican system. We begin by tracing the transformation of Mexico from a highly centralized system, to a decentralized federal republic. For most of the twentieth century, Mexico was dominated by a single ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI. Consequently, we focus on the institutions shaping the political arena for that party and its legislators. Subsequently, we introduce the two parties that are now competing with the PRI, and compare their structure, electoral base, and incentives. Finally, we discuss electoral rules and summarize our hypotheses.

Although formally a federal system, for many years Mexico was effectively a unitary political system - highly centralized with power and resources flowing down from the national executive.[6] Legislators' relationships with electorates were weakened, state parties were made reliant on their national committees, and governors were debilitated into mere administrators of central authority. Weldon (1997, 2002) identifies three factors that jointly enabled metaconstitutional presidentialism in Mexico: (1) unified government, (2) party discipline, and (3) the president's position as party leader. The PRI's discipline and large majorities in both chambers of the legislature guaranteed

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it control over policy; the President's authority over the party concentrated that power in the executive branch. These institutions were preserved by centralized control of the distribution of political and bureaucratic opportunities (Nacif, 2002).

This combination of formal and informal institutions increased the centralization of power, leading to a system that was neither federal nor democratic. The Congress became an ornamental branch of the government with only a ceremonial role in the legislation process, rubber-stamping the President's proposals. The prohibition of the consecutive reelection and the extreme party discipline greatly centralized politics in the formally federal system. This system created a mechanism of "reversed accountability"(Ugalde, 2000), where deputies were accountable not to voters, but to the President and national party.[7] Finally, the subordination of the legislature to the executive effectively eliminated all oversight and gave the president wide latitude in distributing national resources(Casar, 2002; Weldon, 2002). All these factors made Mexico a centralized federalist system; that is a system in which the central government completely overwhelmed the constituent governments (Riker, 1964).

Governors, who might have provided an alternative source of job opportunities and campaign resources, were also severely constrained, primarily by the threat of removal and the lack of local competition for popular support. The Federal Upper Chamber has the constitutional authority to remove governors and remove state governments (Weldon, 1997). Since the ruling party had the majority of the Senate, the constant threat of removal increased governors' loyalty to central authority. Second, the free interpretation of local governments to the electoral codes prevented opposition parties from running candidates in some states (Ochoa-Reza, 2004). Consequently, PRI governors usually did not faced opponents from other parties.

The net result was that the independent authority of state actors was virtually eliminated. The

existence of Mexico's *metaconstitutional* powers meant that representatives' futures depended on their relationships with and loyalty to the president.[8] The president was even powerful enough to order gubernatorial resignations with a single phone call. For example, during the Salinas administration, sixteen governors "voluntarily resigned" their positions. Two of them, Salvador Neme Castillo from Tabasco and Mario Ramón Beteta from the State of Mexico, were ordered to resign due to their "lack of loyalty" to the president and the party (Ward and Rodriguez, 1999). The other fourteen were ordered to resign and take ministerial positions with the federal government. With the hyper-centralization of the PRI governments, loyalty to the party ensured continued access to jobs and resources; disloyalty ended one's career.

The informal dominance of the PRI effectively muted the potential influence of other actors. Once the PRI lost control of the regime - first by losing its majority control of Congress, later by losing control of the executive branch - the informal institutions that maintained the cohesion of the political actors in the system disappeared. In their place were the existing, if forgotten, formal rules of the Constitution, as well as other informal institutions and actors whose influence had been long muted. Previous work has noted how these changes weakened the President vis-á-vis the legislative branch, but an additional and important impact has been the creation of a new political space and autonomy for other political actors, and their increasing influence in national politics.[9] In the new arena, legislators must balance the sometimes competing demands of state governors and electorates, as well as national party leaders and the President.

Electoral reforms in Mexico gradually created space for political competition. The ruling PRI, in spite of its tight grip on power, faced an increasing legitimacy problem, partly due to inadequate economic performance, and partly due to a series of disastrous policy decisions.[10] In response, the PRI gradually opened the political system, reduced electoral fraud, and eventually allowed

for opposition victories. Examples include the introduction of proportional representation (PR) seats for local councils and state congress (1977-1983), the homogenization for requirements for the national parties to compete in local elections (1973), the expansion of the number of both plurality and PR seats in the Federal Congress (1977-1996), the creation of an Assembly for Representatives in Mexico City (1986), the election of the mayor of Mexico City after of fifty years of president selection (1996), and the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute (1990) (Ochoa-Reza, 2004). These modifications increased the competitiveness of the electoral system and led to opposition victories in local elections. In 1989, Ernesto Ruffo in Baja California became the first governor from an opposition party. By 2000, when Vicente Fox was elected President, opposition parties had won governorships in eleven states, and 35.5% of Mexicans had lived under non-PRI governorships(Lujambio, 2001).

The increasingly competitive electoral environment had a second important effect: it greatly weakened the PRI's centralized national control over careers (at least for SMD candidates), by ending its monopoly over political opportunity. Electoral competition created incentives for the PRI to nominate candidates based on electability, instead of party loyalty, ending the "reversed accountability" of earlier periods. Ambitious politicians were no longer reliant on the the party leadership for promotion and advancement. They could now run - and win - in other parties.[11] In response, the PRI adopted primary elections to select candidates for its single-member district elections, though PR candidates were still selected by the national party organization. The net result was that the national party organization lost much of its influence over SMD legislators, who now had to focus on local constituencies instead of national party leaders.

Finally, there was a dramatic decentralization of budget resources, greatly empowering local executives vis-a-vis national legislators. Beginning in the 1990's, federal legislators and governors

lobbied aggressively for a decentralization of the federal budget, which weakened executive power over pork.[12] At the same time, the economic crisis in 1994 pushed President Zedillo into a "New Federalism", which institutionalized new discretion and authority for the spending of subnational governments, in five areas: (1) revenue-sharing, (2) states' capacity to raise taxation, (3) allocation of social development funds to the states, (4) strength of the administrative capacity of municipalities, and (5) increasing transparency of the administrative functions among the three levels (Rodríguez, 1998). Furthermore, in 1998 a new federal budgetary formula was created, allocating permanent funds to states and municipalities for education, social infrastructure, and health funds. (Díaz-Cayeros, 2004). The decentralization of resources - and pork - weakened the relative influence of national actors and shifted the locus of politics partly to subnational resource distributors. Legislators seeking to distribute pork, or needing resources for their next election, or just wanting a job after their three year term ended could now look to governors for resources.[13]

The modification of the formal institutions and the increase of electoral competitiveness destroyed the metaconstitutional powers of the President, and transformed the Mexican Executive from one of the strongest in the world to one of the weakest among presidential systems. The PRI lost majority control of congress in 1997 and since then, no party has had a majority of seats in either chamber (Lujambio, 2001). The extreme party discipline that characterized PRI deputies has weakened considerably (Nacif, 2002).

The emergence of the opposition parties

The preceding discussion focuses on the dominant PRI. We now consider the situation facing legislators from two other two main parties, the center-left Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), and the center-right National Action Party (PAN). The two share a legacy of opposition to the PRI,

but have different trajectories since then and different degrees of centralization. Both parties were formed in opposition to the PRI and worked for opening and reforming the political system. One implication is that both "grew up" with limited access to pork resources, being mostly shut-out by the PRI. One result was that they had to develop alternative electoral appeals, and are considered more ideological than the PRI (Shefter, 1977; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004).

The PAN was founded in 1939 by conservative entrepreneurs and intellectuals opposed to the state expansion under President Cárdenas, and was the first party to run opposition candidates against the PRI. The party is fairly centralized, and candidate nominations for Congress are chosen through local party conventions. The delegates in these conventions need to be approved by the municipal party committees, which assures doctrinal consistency in the party's candidates (Wuhs, 2006). Since 2000, the PAN has held the Presidency, giving it more national authority to enforce party cohesion. However, this is less meaningful than under the PRI. The PAN's legislators are less dependent on pork for re-election than were their PRI counterparts, and the PAN maintains a hierarchy separate from the Executive. President Fox (2000-2006) was considered an outsider, and had some visible conflicts with the PAN legislators. In contrast, President Calderón (2006-) is very much a party insider and has enjoyed a much closer relationship with the *panista* legislators.

The PRD, in contrast, was formed in 1987 through the merger of a number of small leftist parties, and continues to struggle with this ideological diversity. To assuage the diversity of opinion, the PRD has decentralized nomination procedure, using open primaries to choose candidates. Further, membership ruled have been relaxed over time (Wuhs, 2006). Open primaries with a heterogeneous electorate bring party candidates with a very different ideological profile, which makes difficult legislative cohesion once in Congress. PRD fractionalization was muted during the period of PRI dominance, as the party united in opposition to the practices of ruling party and in favor of a

political opening. Since then, the party has only successfully united when led by a charismatic national figure - during the presidential campaigns of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador. The party has had limited executive success, with few gubernatorial victories, and no presidential victories (but two close losses).

With the alternation of power in the executive power, the president is no longer the party leader.[14] The power void left by the suddenly weakened President has led to a new style of national politics. Mexican Presidents now face great difficulty in implementing major reforms, and can only do so when they construct difficult and complex multi-party coalitions. When making decisions about policy proposals, legislators naturally consider the influence of their national party and of the President. But in the new political arena, they also have incentives to consider the preferences of their governors, state electorates, and state parties.

Consider some examples of just one of these new actors: governors. The transformation of Mexico has increase gubernatorial autonomy from the national government and has increased their influence over their state party delegations to congress.[15] The increased power of the governors also gives them more independence within their parties. For example, the PRD does not recognize the legitimacy of the Presidential elections in 2006 or the current Mexican President, Felipe Calderón. Nevertheless, there were some PRD governors who disobeyed the party's elite and negotiated federal programs for the benefit of their states.[16] Recent political events provide direct evidence of gubernatorial influence over national legislators. In 2006, when a 5% tax on soft drinks was debated, the governors of Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Coahuila, and Sonora pressured PRI senators to oppose the bill, which would hurt producers in their states. Their pressure was aggressive enough for senators to publicly complain (Reforma, December 21, 2006). A year later, when a fiscal reform was discussed in Congress in 2007, PAN leaders knew they would need PRI support to pass

the package. To win more support in Congress, PAN legislators made a series of presentations to PRI *governors*, showing how the reform would increase transfers to state governments. One PAN senator explained their strategy: "there will be the PRI Governors who pressure their legislators" (Reforma, September 6, 2007*b*).

Caveats   We do not expect that all these actors will have equal and constant influence over all deputies. Instead, legislators will pay more or less attention to different gatekeepers depending on their own career challenges. For example, SMD legislators should have stronger ties to local actors and be more responsive to their interests than legislators elected under closed-list proportional representation, especially since the list legislators are elected from multi-state districts, with lists set in almost every case by national committees. [17]   Gubernatorial influence should project only to members of their own party in congress - not to members elected from local opposition parties. Further, gubernatorial influence should be stronger in more pork-oriented regions, and weaker in more ideological environments. Finally, we expect differences according to the centralization and ideological strength of each party.

Not all the nuances of our discussion can be tested, due to identification problems, but we summarize the core hypotheses that we can and do test below:

Hypothesis 1 *Prior to political decentralization, parties should show little evidence of subnational cleavages. Such divisions will appear after the decentralization of political power to subnational actors.*

Hypothesis 2 *After the PRIs loss of the presidency, subnational cleavages will be largest in the PRI and smallest in the PAN. The pork-orientation of the PRI and its supporters, its ideological diversity, and the decentralization of SMD nomination procedures will make subnational divisions in that party largest. The PAN, with control of the presidency, tight monitoring of nominations, and a history of consistent center-right politics, will have the weakest subnational cleavages.*

Hypothesis 3 *Deputies elected under personalistic SMD, especially those with local primary elections, will be most vulnerable to pressure from subnational actors; deputies elected from the multi-state list proportional representation will be least vulnerable to pressure from subnational actors.*

Hypothesis 4 *Deputies with copartisan governors, especially those that are most pork and personalistic oriented, will show greater deviations from national party positions than deputies that do not have a copartisan governor.*

Recent work on similar topics support these hypotheses - and suggest a need for the broader analysis conducted herein. Langston (2010) studies the behavior of a subset of PRI deputies on a single roll-call vote, finding that electoral rules and gubernatorial preferences matter. Her analysis does not tackle the broader question of behavior on the hundreds of other votes, or in other parties, or under other electoral rules. Langston and Rosas (forthcoming) use a spatial model of voting, finding no aggregate impact of subnational actors, except near the end of their terms. We build on these by analyzing the impact of parties and institutions on behavior, and using a nonparametric model that is capable of detecting federal effects that are missed under the assumptions of spatial voting.

Analysis

We test these hypotheses by seeking evidence of state-cleavages within Mexican parties on roll call votes in the Chamber of Deputies. We utilize an original dataset of roll call votes covering the

last four sessions of the Chamber of Deputies.[18] Our tests take two forms - one based on a spatial model, and a more general nonparametric approach. In both cases, we find significant evidence that Mexican parties have subnational cleavages. Evidence further suggests that these cleavages grew substantially over the last four legislatures.

Our tests take two forms. First, we adapt a spatial model to federal politics, where legislators face pressure from national and subnational actors. This approach uses a familiar model and methods, but trades breadth for statistical power. More specifically, the spatial tests can detect the presence of influential subnational actors when their influence is manifest narrowly as a constant unidimensional pressure. Second, we use a nonparametric test to detect examine the data with weaker assumptions. This approach has less statistical power, but can detect subnational cleavages whether spatial or nonspatial. For example, suppose that governors are only occasionally mobilized to pressure deputies, perhaps only on resource distribution bills. A spatial model will often fail to detect that pressure but a nonparametric permutation analysis will pick it up.[19]

We first discuss several details of the data. Our core unit of analysis is the legislator-party-gubernatorial administration. During the period studied, many legislators switched party, becoming independents or joining other parties. Switchers are treated as different observations in the data analysis - legislators' votes are always counted with the party of membership at the time a roll-call vote was cast. If a deputy was a member of the PAN one day and the PRI the next, we count votes before the switch with the PAN, and votes after with the PRI. Similarly, in some of our analysis we distinguish between legislators in their home governor's coalition, and legislators opposing the governor. However, gubernatorial terms do not coincide perfectly with deputy terms; most governors are not elected concurrently with deputies. Again, our unit of analysis is the deputy-party-governor. If a PRI legislator enjoys a PRI governor until July 1st, and a PAN governor after that date, then votes are coded into government and opposition coalitions accordingly.

Our first test is based on a a simple low-dimensional spatial model:

$$\psi_i = \alpha\sigma_j + \beta\gamma_k + (1 - \alpha - \beta)\theta_i \tag{1}$$

where ψ_i is the observed ideal point of legislator i, θ_i is the true underlying bliss point for legislator

i, σ_i is the ideal point of party j, and γ_k is the ideal point of some state actor k, say a state party delegation k.[20] With the restriction that $0 \leq \alpha, \beta \leq 1$ and $\alpha + \beta \leq 1$, the coefficients on each ideal point are the relative influence of each actor's preferences over the legislator, and the observed ideal point ψ_i is a weighted average of their positions. For example, when $\alpha = \beta = 0$, then legislators ignore national parties and state parties when making decisions, and their observed ideal points only reflect their own preferences. When $\alpha = \beta = \frac{1}{3}$, legislators are equally influenced by their national party, state party, and own conscience. Effectively, this means that subnational interests are part of a low-dimensional space and are manifest through constant influence over legislators.

Unfortunately, straightforward estimation of (1) is impossible, because we do not have estimates for any of the unobserved underlying ideal points of parties (σ_j), state parties (γ_k), or legislators (θ_i).[21] However, with modest assumptions, we can still test for patterns of dispersion that reflect national and state actors' influence using a simple analysis of variance framework.[22]

We begin our analysis by providing some simple tests of these secondary implications, in a two-step process. Following Lewis' 2000 recommendations, we estimate ideal points for several dimensions, then run an analysis of variance on ideal points, testing for a reduction in unexplained variance with the inclusion of state indicators, electoral system indicators, and gubernatorial indicators.[23]

We ran simple ANOVA models with ideal points as the dependent variable, and dummy variables for party, state, governor, and state party as the independent variables. We analyzed dimensions one and two, which appeared to explain most of the variance in the roll-call vote data. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

The analysis provides consistent evidence of subnational cleavages in Mexican parties. Note first that the party factor explains most of the variance in ideal points for both dimensions, for all periods. For all the periods, an R^2 from a model only including party dummy variables was always above .94 for first dimension ideal points, and .80 for second dimension scores. The obvious conclusion is that most of legislative behavior can be explained by party membership.

However, in every period studied, at least one - and sometimes all - of the state factors (state, state governor, or state party) were significant. For first dimension results, all three state factors

were significant for the 57th legislature, though the magnitude of their improvement in fit is less impressive. A model with just the party factor yields an R^2 of .96; after adding the state factors, the is .976. The marginal change in fit remains small - but significant - for first dimension results for other periods. In these other models, the variables achieving conventional levels of significance change quite a bit - sometimes state-party, sometimes state-governor.

Results looking at second dimension ideal points are similar, with a few important differences. Most notably, the marginal increase in fit is much larger than on the first dimension, suggesting that more state conflicts are manifest on second dimension bills than on first. For example, adding the state factors increases the R^2 from .818 to .879 in the 57th period. As with the first dimension, the specific patterns of which factors matter most tell no consistent story. In the 57th legislature, all but state is significant in the full model. In the 58th and 59th the state factors appear collinear, and in the 60th, only state-party is significant in the final model.

The ANOVA analysis suggests four core conclusions. Parties explain the majority of variance on both the first and second dimensions. There are consistent significant state effects that divide parties. And the apparent magnitude of effects is higher on the second than on the first dimension. There is evidence that all subnational actors (state parties, governors, and electorates) are driving state cleavages, but it is not consistent across time or the dimensionality of the policy space.

Permutation Results

For a second test, we use a nonparametric cohesion score analysis. This test has less statistical power for the spatial model - but can detect subnational cleavages under alternative models. The ideal point model, above, works best when state actors exert a constant influence over legislators in a low-dimensional ideal space. But if state conflicts are over resources, or only mobilize actors from time to time, the spatial model may fail to detect their presence or return inconsistent results. The nonparametric approach we adopt herein can detect spatial and nonspatial cleavages.

The key test of the model is to compare state party cohesion on roll-call votes with overall party

cohesion. For a party i, define the cohesion of state delegation j on a single vote as:

$$c_{ij} = \frac{|Y_{ij} - N_{ij}|}{Y_{ij} - N_{ij}}$$

and overall state party cohesion is thus the average of all state delegations, weighted by size:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} = \frac{1}{w_j} \frac{|Y_{ij} - N_{ij}|}{Y_{ij} - N_{ij}}$$

For example, in the United States, $c_{R,AZ}$ might be the cohesion of all Republicans from Arizona, and thus $c_{\bar{R}}$ would be the average cohesion of state Republican delegations.

If dissension within a party has nothing to do with state politics, we expect defectors to be represented across all states, on average, and state-party cohesion will be similar to overall national party cohesion. But if dissension reflects the politics of federalism, then defections will be concentrated in a subset of states (the subsets may vary over time, of course). A key feature of the method is the use of permutations to correct for bias in cohesion scores and to conduct inference. The method has been applied to study federalism in other countries and is well-documented in the literature (**???**).

Figure 1 and 2 show the results of a nonparametric permutation analysis on our dataset; these results are also presented more fully in Tables 3 and 4. Beginning with Figure 1, the dotted line shows national party cohesion, the dashed line shows mean state party cohesion, and the histogram shows permutated state delegation cohesion. Interpretation is easy - when the dashed line is covered by the histogram, we do not reject the null. When the dashed line is outside the histogram, these results are unlikely to happen randomly, and we reject the null hypothesis of no state effects.[24] More specifically, statistical significance is determined by quantiles of the permuted values; if actual state party cohesion exceeds 82% of the permutations, then one-sided significance is .18; if it exceeds 95% of the values in the histogram, then one-sided significance is .05. And if observed values exceed *all* of the permuted values, then the p-value is less than .0001[25].

Let's first examine overall party cohesion, represented by the dotted line, and also shown in the first column of Table 3. Overall party cohesion was very high in the last session of PRI control,

.96. It falls substantially with the first non-PRI president (58th legislature, .8350), and though it has risen, never reaches the high levels of party cohesion observed under the PRI. The change from the disciplined period of PRI hegemony is impressive, and suggest an important transformation of the party system. However, this weakening could reflect any number of things, not just an increase in subnational conflict and influence.

Do these changes reflect a simple weakening of party discipline and a rise in personal vote-seeking, or could they also reflect increasing cleavages between state delegations? The permutation analysis answers this question, and provides support for a dramatic increase in regional cleavages in national parties. For example, examining the graph for the 57th legislature, average national party cohesion was about .965 (the dotted vertical line). Average cohesion for state-party delegations was almost .976 (the dashed vertical line). However, just being higher than national party cohesion does not mean that there are state cleavages; as demonstrated elsewhere in the literature, state party cohesion is always equal to or greater than higher than overall cohesion. The key baselines are the histograms - these show the distribution of state party cohesion when calculated with randomly permuted votes. In other words, if a fall in party cohesion were *not* had nothing to do with cross-state differences, then state party cohesion would be somewhere in the histogram. If it is *higher*, that is statistically significant evidence of state cleavages within parties.

The results show evidence of state cleavages within parties for every period studied, with a dramatic increase in the magnitude of the effects after the PRI's loss of hegemony. In the first period, the 57th legislature, party cohesion was very high, with very small - but still significant - regional divisions within parties. Note how the dashed line is outside the permuted range - just barely - and that all the values are very high (mean party cohesion .964; state party cohesion .976).

After the PRI's loss of the Presidency, institutional changes led to a massive decentralization of power. These changes are evidence in the cohesion scores. Beginning in the 58th legislature, party cohesion falls precipitously and federal effects grow exponentially. For the 58th legislature, mean party cohesion is only about .83, while state party cohesion is .89. Since the null distribution - the range of permuted values - only covers .86-.87, we reject the null hypothesis of no state party divisions in the national legislature, significant at the .0001 level. For the 59th legislature, overall

cohesion rises modestly, but state party cohesion remains well above the range of permuted values, again indicating within-party state divisions in roll-call votes. By the 60th legislature, overall cohesion has again risen, but significant subnational effects persist.

We can put these into perspective by standardizing scores. To do so, we compare the relative size of the state effects with the divergence from perfect party cohesion, coming up with the percentage of defection attributable to state cleavages:

$$f = \frac{c_s - c_{p50}}{1 - c_{p50}}$$

where c_s is state party cohesion and c_{p50} is permuted state party cohesion. For example, in the 57th, state party cohesion was .9758, and median permuted cohesion was .9742. The maximum cohesion score is 1.0 for perfect group unanimity on all votes. So the overall divergence from perfect cohesion (1-.9742) is .0258. And the magnitude of state party effects (divergence from the median null) can be calculated as .9758-.9742=.0016. So .0016/.0258 = .062, or 6% of the within-party disagreements might be attributed to state cleavages. By these calculations, state cleavages grow substantially from the 57th to 59th legislatures, then weaken in the 60th, as shown in Table 5. From the 57th, where state effects were just 6%, they rise to 18% in the 58th, 27% in the 59th, then fall to 10% in the first part of the 60th legislature. The data show a massive shift in the nature of Mexican legislative politics in response to the institutional changes in the political arena, with a more than 400% increase in the effect of state cleavages from the 57th to the 59th legislatures. This requires several observations. First, there was a substantial drop in party cohesion, and state party cleavages contributed significantly to that drop. Second, the drop in party cohesion also reflects non-federal effects - local vote and career seeking that does not correspond to the new federalism. Indeed, the percent attributable to state cleavages never exceeds 30% - suggesting that many other factors are playing a role in Mexican politics as well. Third, even so, the rise of state effects is impressive. For the 59th legislature, more than a fourth of defections are attributable to state cleavages - this is a substantial figure in a country that previously had a highly centralized and unified party system.

Figure 3 shows results for Mexico's three biggest parties, the PRI, PAN, and PRD. In these

graphs, each subgraph in the matrix shows results a different party, the legislatures are numbered on the x-axis, and cohesion is measured on the y-axis. The vertical range of the red box shows the range of the 10,000 permuted subgroup cohesion scores. The solid line shows state party cohesion, and the dotted line shows national party cohesion. Note that the y-axis is *not* constant, but is scaled to each party.

Just looking at the dotted lines shows the dramatic changes in overall party cohesion during this period. The PRI began with nearly perfect cohesion in the 57th legislature, which plummeted to under .80 for a national average for the 58th and 59th legislatures, then rose above .95 again in the 60th legislature. The leftist PRD had high cohesion in the 57th (.96), which fell for the 58th, rose for the 59th, and fell to its lowest point in the 60th, after the internal conflict within the party between two leadership groups: the former presidential candidate, López Obrador, and the leader of the party, Jesús Ortega. This conflict was exacerbated during the internal election in 2008, within which there was a highly contested and protested process, which fractionalized the party in two different groups (El Universal, March 13th, 2008).

The PAN began with fairly high cohesion which fell to .86 during Fox's first term. The party experienced a transition from being in the opposition to being in the government at both local and federal levels. With more than fifty years contesting government and playing the role of opposition player, the PAN experienced difficulties when it defined responsibilities and accountability mechanism once in office. Local executives came across opposition from their own partisans during the first PAN gubernatorial experiences. Governor Barrio in Chihuahua commented that during his first three years in charge, the PAN "behaved more as an opposition party "(Mizrahi, 1998, p. 111). [26] In contrast, President Calderon (60th legislature) leveraged his status as a party insider to solidify relationships with legislative party leaders and improve coordination with the legislative branch on policy. Since then, PAN cohesion has been the highest of the three parties.

We can interpret these results by calculating the percent of defections attributable to cleavages, as above. Party-by-party standardized figures are reported in Table 5, and are consistent with our hypothesis: the biggest effects were observed for the PRI. For the 57th legislature, even with extremely high cohesion, 14% of defections were already explained by state conflict.[27] Once out

of the Presidency, state cleavages rose immediately to 27%, then 30% of defections. The PAN, in contrast, has the lowest levels of state-based defections, never exceeding 10%. The PRD has a steady 8-10% over the entire period.

Finally, Figure 2 shows the permutation analysis with legislators categorized according to party, electoral rules (single-member district or closed-list proportional representation), and gubernatorial coalition status (government or opposition). Graphs labeled "CLPR" are for deputies elected under closed-list rules; graphs labeled "SMD" are for majoritarian districts. Similarly, graphs labeled "GOV" are for deputies from states where a copartisan controls the governor's office, and "OPP" for deputies whose home governor is from an opposing party.

The results are consistent with our core hypotheses. The largest and most consistent effects are for SMD legislators, especially those from the PRI and with copartisan governors. One metric is simply comparing the frequency of cases where the observed value exceeds 95% of all permuted values. Evidence of subnational cleavages is weakest for closed-list deputies without a copartisan governor. These legislators are usually nominated by center authorities, are less likely to have strong local ties and more likely to be party loyalist, and have reason to respond to gubernatorial pressure. Of the twelve cases examined (3 parties * 4 periods), state party cohesion exceeds the 95th quantile of null distribution in three cases (PRI, 58th legislature; PAN, 58th and 60th legislatures). Comparing this baseline with closed-list deputies that *do* have a copartisan governor, five cases (PRI 57th, 58th, 59th; PAN 59th, 60th) have subnational cleavages significant at the .0001 level. Alternatively, comparing the baseline with single member district legislators with opposition governors, seven of the twelve cases show subnational cleavages significant at the .05 level. Finally, the combination of single member districts and copartisan governors also has seven of twelve cases with significant subnational cleavages (PAN 58th, PRD 59th and 60th, PRI 57th-60th). Further, of these, the PRI is always well-represented, accounting for more than half of the significant results, and generating significant results for every single-member district cohort analyzed.

The massive decentralization of Mexican politics did transform the political system, but with differential effects within and across parties. Politicians elected under personalistic rules had stronger ties to subnational gatekeepers than those elected under the multi-state closed-list system. The

presence of a copartisan governor increased opportunities, and pressure for legislators to defect from their party line. And the PRI, struggling to find its place in a new political world, was most likely to suffer the effects of subnational cleavages.

We reiterate the need for caution in interpretation. Breaking party analysis into subgroups by electoral systems will lead to empty cell problems. For example, a state where the PRD has just one SMD and one CLPR deputy can be included without problems in the overall party analysis, but will drop out of the party-electoral system analysis. [28] Further, comparisons of raw cohesion scores can be confounded by agenda control and other factors. And large p-values, or insignificant results, may reflect different distributions of legislators across states, as well as the systematic factors we have sought to investigate. But the results are suggestive and entirely consistent with our hypotheses.

Discussion

In this paper, we have examined the new federalism of Mexico and its impact on the coherence of national political parties. Using an original dataset of roll-call votes from the last four legislative sessions, we have demonstrated the existence of subnational cleavages in national parties. These cleavages were present - but very small - before the PRI's losing the Mexican Presidency. Since then, party cohesion has slipped substantially, and much of this decline can be attributed to an increasing presence of subnational cleavages. Just 6% of disunity in parties can be attributed to subnational cleavages during the PRI's reign, but this rises to 18%, then over 27% during the 58th and 59th sessions. The effects persist, but are smaller in the 60th, at 11%. These effects are especially pronounced for legislators in the PRI, from single member districts, and with copartisan governors.

We see several implications from our research, which we discuss in this section, as well as several shortcomings that will require additional research to resolve. We begin with our limitations. Our analysis has several limitations, primarily problems associated with any study of roll-call votes. Further, the magnitude of effects, though consistent with our hypotheses, are subject to multiple interpretations. In particular, agenda control may have a great deal of influence over the apparent

magnitude of subnational interests' influence. There are no easy solutions to any of these problems.

Regarding our contributions, our first is to reinforce the importance of both formal and informal institutions in shaping the political arena. Much of the literature on institutions enjoys a subtle ambiguity regarding the differences between formal and informal institutions. In most contexts, the ambiguity is not problematic. Both types of institutions profoundly shape human behavior. The most important of each type are fairly stable and often endure centuries.

The evolution of the Mexican system illustrates these points. Most of Mexico's 20th century experience was as a highly centralized political system.(Casar, 2002; Nacif, 2002; Weldon, 2003). The ruling party was centralized and hierarchical, with national, state, and local politicians organized in hierarchical political networks, much like the Japanese *keiratsu* (Scheiner, 2005). Accountability in this political system flowed downward from the President.

Since the PRIs loss of the Presidency, the system has been dramatically transformed. From one of the most centralized systems, it has become one of the most decentralized. Evidence of conflict between regional and national interests, which was either suppressed or dealt with quietly under PRI dominance, is now a frequent news item (Díaz-Cayeros, 2005). Governors who once resigned on command now insult the President and challenge national authority over local elections.

An important part of this transformation is the regionalization of national parties. Over the last four legislative sessions, subnational actors are increasingly influential over national politicians. From virtually no impact in the first period, there are now significant subnational effects for all three major parties, which can be linked to state governors, parties, and electorates.

Our research suggests important mechanisms for how this takes place. The legislators most responsive to subnational interests were those from a party with a long history of distributive and coercive politics with powerful local gatekeepers. Regarding the first of these points, our findings suggest that subnational cleavages will be strongest in pork-based, as opposed to policy-based political systems. In systems where political advancement is based on resource distribution, the centralization or fragmentation of the party system depends on the centralization of political power and resource distribution. Both of these patterns are apparent in the PRI, before and after democratization. Comparing the behavior of PRI deputies, elected under SMD rules, with local PRI

governors, the results are most stark. Table 4 shows that state party cohesion for the PRI account for all the legislatures, explaining at least 23% of the deviations from total party cohesion. In contrast, deputies in the ideological PAN show only modest responsiveness to decentralization, for their overall cohesion is consistently higher than PRI deputies. Further, even among SMD-Governor PAN deputies, state party cleavages are significant only for the 58th legislature, accounting for the 7% of the deviations from total party cohesion.

These results echo the comparative literature on decentralization and party systems. ? find that a major difference between Japan and Brazil is the structure of discretionary spending. Decentralized spending creates a decentralized party system in Brazil; centralized spending creates a highly centralized party system in Japan. A key assumption here is that politics for legislators is primarily about pork delivery. In contrast, Chhibber and Kollman (2004) find that a strong policy orientation assuages the pressures of regional divisions. Where politics is about policy choice, not pork delivery, parties have strong incentives to build a meaningful brand name. While there is tolerance for some diversity of opinion, there is always pressure and electoral reward to a unified meaningful position - and label (Cox, 1987; Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Our results - leveraging the diversity of the Mexican system and its recent transformation - show how both can be correct, depending on the formal and informal institutions.

For Mexico, these changes may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they have reversed patterns of accountability, with subnational politicians now devoted to subnational interests and actors. For proponents of decentralization, these changes may be positive, decreasing corruption, improving public goods provision, and uniformly improving representation.

On the other hand, this decentralization has also created space for subnational authoritarianism and threatens central government effectiveness. On the first point, some politicians have created state fiefdoms. Combining clientelism and single party dominance at the state level, these systems suffer rampant corruption, electoral fraud, and ineffective government (Gibson, 2005; Cornelius, 1999, 2000; Snyder, 1999). However, the central government has so far proven less effective at imposing good government than has been seen in other federal systems, Brazil for example. On the second point, increasing regionalism might eventually weaken national parties' ability to present a

unified front to voters, to develop their own brand name and thus consolidate the party system, and ultimately, to advance a cohesive national agenda. [29]

For students of Mexico, this is only a first step in an important new and evolving research agenda. Many dimensions of federalism and the national party system deserve additional attention. One obvious next step is to explore the variance in federalism - why legislators from some regions are more responsive to subnational actors than legislators from other regions. Another important agenda is investigating the variance we have not explained - the drop in party cohesion not attributable to state cleavages. We look forward to participating in this agenda, and invite scholars to join using the roll-call data that is available on our website.

For students of federalism, Mexico illustrates the importance of informal institutions for countering the centripetal forces of federalism that pull national actors away from the political center. The implication is that future work on formally federal systems should examine the interaction of formal and informal institutions shaping the extent of political centralization. Previous work has shown how the centralization or decentralization of resources helps explain the extent of political parties' centralization, or decentralization. Our findings reinforces that finding, but also demonstrate how even budgetary authority may be an informal institution, and part of a reinforcing equilibrium. In the Mexican case, the centralization of resources and the one-party system were self-reinforcing. Centralization empowered one-party unified government, allowing the PRI Presidents to manipulate the system and distribute resources to key constituencies to preserve electoral dominance. At the same time, one party unified government was a precondition for the complete centralization of resources; without it, the central government lost its monopoly on political ambition and opportunity, as well as on pork and other goods' distributions.

Notes

[1]Furthermore, federalism's economic advantages have not gone unchallenged. Some criticize the economic outcome - less redistribution and weaker state governments - as detrimental to the needs of local populations, especially in poorer regions with small tax bases. From this perspective, intra-state competition means less tax revenue, lower literacy rates, and less public health. See, for example, Prud'homme (1995).

[2]For example, although we normally think of Japan as unitary, it does have many of the *formal* institutions of

federalism. Between that country's parliament and municipal governments are 47 subnational units (prefectures), each with an independently elected subnational legislature and governor. The structure of politics, however, is highly centralized with politicians highly accountable to central party leadership.(Scheiner, 2006)

[3]Note that the examples here are of distributional and resource politics - not of differences in a policy space. It is possible that parties in federal systems are split due to regional ideological differences. Democrats from Arizona tend to support stronger gun rights than Democrats from Massachusetts, for example. However, as others have argued, when political conflict is highly ideological (versus resource or pork oriented), there are strong pressures for party system nationalization (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004).

[4]There are always exceptions. For example, Colombia is considered a federal system, but Senators are elected from a nationwide at-large system.

[5]Mayer (1970) notes that federalism's impact is greatest when the formal institutions are accompanied by regional social differences. These differences presumably created great opportunities for policy disagreements across regions.

[6]The Mexican Revolution of 1910 initially provided a new opportunity for subnational actors to assert their authority, but ultimately resulted in a highly centralized political system. While scholars have labeled some of the first post-Revolution governments to be effectively federal. Lujambio (1995) argues that Mexico was effectively federal during several pre- and post-revolutionary periods: 1824-1835, 1847-1853, and 1867-1876, during the first years of Porfirio Díaz government, when Francisco I. Madero was president (1911-1913), and 1917-1929 after the revolution. By 1930, the system was highly centralized.

[7]Interviews with legislators portray representatives that were relatively uninterested in the concerns of their constituencies(Morgenstern, 2002; Ugalde, 2000).

[8]Personal relationships were very important and reinforced loyalty. For instance, during the Carlos Salinas' administration, almost one third of the governors had a previous professional or academic relationship with the president (Centeno, 1994, p.169).

[9]To better understand the causes of the change, we recommend a reading of Greene (2007).

[10]The poor performance of the ruling party after a major earthquake, and the massacre of hundreds of protesting students are two of many examples.

[11]One important result was increasing party switching, especially defections from the ruling party. PRI contenders that did not receive nominations for office began to seek nomination in other parties(Casar, 2002). For example, Dante Delgado from Veracruz and Roberto Albores from Chiapas, two interim governors that were designated during the Salinas' presidency, left the PRI when they were not given their party's nomination for governor. While Delgado was candidate for governor in 2004, Albores endorsed another ex-PRI member, Juan Sabines, in 2006.

[12]For example, in 1995, the Partido Acción Nacional mayor in the border city of Ciudad Juárez, Francisco Villarreal, held a twenty-four day hunger strike in an effort to receive toll revenues from the international bridges that were built in that city. This action had, in the words of Villarreal, the goal of "achieving the existence of a true federalism" (Karamura, 1995).

[13]Governors were not powerless before. But their resources pool was smaller, and their accountability for their actions was to the national PRI - not their local constituents.

[14]This change was implemented by Ernesto Zedillo, who declared that he would maintain a "healthy distance" between party and presidency. Moreover, when Vicente Fox arrived to the power, the leader of the PAN deputies, Felipe Calderón, declared that the parliamentary group would behave in an autonomous and independent way when dealing with the president(Ugalde, 2000, p 122).

[15]Conflict between governors and the national government is now frequent in both minor and major policy areas An example of that is the conflict between the PRD Mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and PAN's Vicente Fox about daylight savings time in 2001. When the federal government announced the implementation of daylight savings time, Mexico City's government decreed its noncompliance with the federal time change. Moreover, López Obrador sent the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that states have the power of legislation over the measurement of the time. The Supreme Court ruled that the federal government did not have the power to set time only by federal law; however, it also explicitly states that states do not have the power to legislate about time zones and daylight savings (Reforma, April 7, 2001).

[16] "I respect López Obrador (the former presidential candidate), but I have to respond for Chiapas; I work only for Chiapas" said Governor Sabines in 2007 (Reforma, June 27, 2007a).

[17]Note that different types of politicians run for different types of offices. Ambitious politicians with a solid local base are more likely to seek SMD positions. Party loyalists and novices are more likely to be on the closed-list system (Langston, 2010).

[18]We were unable to obtain roll-call votes from earlier periods because, although the law states that all final passage votes should be a recorded roll call vote, the only records available are from the second year of the 57th legislature; that is, September 1998. The data of the 60th legislature includes information until May 2008.

[19]See ? for details.

[20] Equation 1 could be generalized to more than one state actor, of course, but we assume just one to illustrate the model and challenges.

[21]Even if we did have reliable measures of some of these underlying preferences, identification may still be a problem without party-switching or other changes. See Xfor an example and a solution.

[22]Assuming iid distributions of legislators (θ) within each party, and iid distributions of subnational actors (γ) within party, each state party's delegation will have different mean ideal points.

[23]An alternative approach is to incorporate make more explicit assumptions about state actors, and estimate the parameters in a single step using any of a variety of methods. This is the approach pursued by Rosas and Langston (2009).

[24]Note that the units vary across histograms, as the across-period variance is large and would mask the quantities of interest.

[25]There were 10,000 permuted values, so exceeding all of them implies a one-sided significance level of less than

$\frac{1}{10000} = .0001$.

[26] Also, former governor Ruffo in Baja California recognized that panistas knew how to "push" but no to "pull" (Mizrahi, 1998, p. 111).

[27] This is consistent with previous research which has argued that while the PRI quelled open state conflict, much of the internal politics of the PRI reflected struggles between regional organizations.

[28] A state delegation of one legislator will always have a cohesion score of 1.0. Since there is no variance in scores, including these observations adds no explanatory power.

[29] Regional splits have appeared as an obstacle for party cohesion in the PAN. For instance, during the second half of 2007, a bill concerned with a new gasoline tax divided the PAN deputies to the point that legislators from eight states threatened to leave the party. "PAN did not give us the legislative seats, but we gave them to the PAN. If they want the new tax, we will declare ourselves independent deputies," said the PAN deputy from Veracruz, Marco Salas (Reforma, June 15, 2009).

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: ANOVA Analysis for the first W-NOMINATE dimension

57th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	183.560***	184.699***	185.745***	187.154***
Party	183.560***	141.281***	34.586***	2.0581***
State		1.140***	0.841***	0.740 ***
State—Governor			1.046***	0.784***
State—Party				1.409***
Residual	8.202	7.062	6.016	4.607
R^2	0.957	0.963	0.969	0.976

58th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	135.907***	137.227***	138.222**	138.786***
Party	135.907***	109.859***	62.453***	1.973***
State		1.320***	0.708**	0.338
State—Governor			0.995***	0.681**
State—Party				0.564
Residual	8.218	6.899	5.903	5.339
R^2	0.943	0.952	0.959	0.963

59th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	160.979***	161.408***	161.833***	162.147***
Party	160.979***	125.346***	56.889***	2.007***
State		0.429***	0.554***	0.266**
State—Governor			0.425***	0.214
State—Party				0.313**
Residual	3.362	2.933	2.507	2.194
R^2	0.979	0.982	0.985	0.987

60th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	117.486***	118.168***	118.578***	119.611***
Party	117.486***	69.553***	40.061***	2.755***
State		0.686***	0.500	0.370
State—Governor			0.410	0.368
State—Party				1.033**
Residual	6.619	5.932	5.521	4.488
R^2	0.947	0.952	0.955	0.964

*** $F < .001$, ** $F < .010$, * $F < .050$

Table 2: ANOVA Analysis for the second W-NOMINATE dimension

57th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	79.092***	80.248***	82.787***	85.116***
Party	79.092***	60.791***	20.352***	1.134***
State		1.155***	1.654**	0.944
State—Governor			2.539***	2.185***
State—Party				2.329***
Residual	17.650	16.495	13.955	11.626
R^2	0.818	0.829	0.856	0.879

58th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	63.268***	65.016***	66.240***	67.108***
Party	63.268***	53.236***	16.875***	1.382***
State		1.748**	0.957	0.748
State—Governor			1.224*	1.012
State—Party				0.868
Residual	15.501	13.754	12.530	11.662
R^2	0.803	0.825	0.841	0.852

59th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	65.561***	67.591***	69.397***	70.138***
Party	65.561***	50.587***	10.452***	0.510**
State		2.030***	1.017*	0.899
State—Governor			1.806***	1.021
State—Party				0.741
Residual	14.226	12.197	10.380	9.650
R^2	0.822	0.847	0.870	0.879

60th Legislature

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Model	117.486***	118.168***	118.578***	119.611***
Party	117.486***	69.553***	40.061***	2.755***
State		0.686***	0.500	0.370
State—Governor			0.410	0.368
State—Party				1.033**
Residual	6.619	5.932	5.521	4.488
R^2	0.947	0.952	0.955	0.964

*** $F < .001$, ** $F < .010$, * $F < .050$

Table 3: Permutation Analyses

| | National Level Cohesion | State Delegation Cohesion Permuted Quantiles | | | | | | Effective |
		0%	2.5%	50%	97.5%	100%	Observed	P-Value
Total								
57th	0.9647	0.9728	0.9735	0.9742	0.9749	0.9756	0.9758	0.0000
58th	0.8350	0.8586	0.8611	0.8638	0.8666	0.8685	0.8883	0.0000
59th	0.8817	0.8960	0.8977	0.8993	0.901	0.9024	0.9269	0.0000
60th	0.9423	0.9525	0.9534	0.9544	0.9555	0.9566	0.9592	0.0000
PAN								
57th	0.9275	0.9364	0.9389	0.9411	0.9434	0.9454	0.9433	0.0293
58th	0.8633	0.8753	0.8788	0.8824	0.8862	0.8908	0.8904	0.0001
59th	0.9737	0.9764	0.9771	0.9782	0.9795	0.9809	0.9798	0.0094
60th	0.9765	0.978	0.9788	0.9798	0.9808	0.9818	0.9818	0.0001
PRD								
57th	0.9573	0.9625	0.9636	0.9649	0.9664	0.9681	0.9676	0.0007
58th	0.9082	0.9313	0.9365	0.9419	0.9481	0.9544	0.9473	0.0421
59th	0.9674	0.9694	0.9707	0.9720	0.9735	0.9752	0.9746	0.0006
60th	0.8804	0.8955	0.8978	0.9003	0.903	0.9061	0.9090	0.0000
PRI								
57th	0.9948	0.9948	0.9948	0.9948	0.9951	0.9954	0.9955	0.0000
58th	0.7615	0.7911	0.7963	0.8017	0.8073	0.8118	0.8558	0.0000
59th	0.7652	0.7899	0.7936	0.7973	0.8011	0.8049	0.8588	0.0000
60th	0.9409	0.9489	0.9513	0.9542	0.9573	0.9607	0.9620	0.0000

Table 4: Permutation Analyses by Electoral Rules and Gubernatorial Alignment

	Period			
	57th	58th	59th	60th
Single-Member District Copartisan Governor				
PAN		0.07		
PRD			0.10	0.07
PRI	0.23	0.40	0.37	0.25
Single-Member District Opposition Governor				
PAN		0.07		0.10
PRD			0.40	0.15
PRI	0.24	0.14	0.29	0.30
Closed-List PR Copartisan Governor				
PAN			0.30	0.24
PRD				
PRI	0.48	0.19	0.23	
Closed-List PR Opposition Governor				
PAN		0.16		0.26
PRD	0.15			
PRI		0.18		

Values are quantiles of observed subgroup cohesion when compared with the distribution of permuted values. Values shown achieve one-sided significance at the .05 level (i.e., the observed values exceeded at least 9,500 out of the 10,000 random permutations).

Table 5: Measuring the Magnitude of State Effects

	Cohesion			
Period	Overall	PRI	PAN	PRD
57th	6.2%	13.5%	3.7%	7.7%
58th	18.0%	27.3%	6.8%	9.3%
59th	27.3%	30.3%	7.3%	9.3%
60th	10.5%	17.0%	9.9%	8.7%

Values are the percentage of deviations from perfect cohesion that can be attributed to state cleavages.

Figure 1: Federal Influences on Roll Call Votes, 57th-60th Legislatures

Figure 2: Federal Influences on Roll Call Votes by Party, Electoral Rules, and Gubernatorial Status, 57th-60th Legislatures

Figure 3: Federal Influences on Roll Call Votes by Party, 57th-60th Legislatures